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"LOOK-ALIKE" CAPSULES, GENERIC DRUG
SUBSTITUTION, AND THE LANHAM
ACT: THE ELUSIVE
CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT
STANDARD OF INWOOD LABORATORIES, INC.
V IVES LABORA TORIES, INC.
Since the early 1970's, over thirty states have enacted some form of leg-
islation to allow pharmacists to substitute generic versions of name brand
prescription drug products' under appropriate circumstances.2 This flurry
of legislative activity has resulted from growing consumer dissatisfaction
with the high cost of prescription drugs,3 the increased availability of
generic alternatives4 and the lobbying efforts of the generic drug
manufacturers.'
Although generic drug substitution laws reflect a public policy favoring
competitive pricing, they have paradoxically increased the likelihood of
1. For a comprehensive survey of the various state generic drug substitution laws, see
generally, Note, Consumer Protection and Prescription Drugs. The Generic Drug Substitution
Laws, 67 Ky. L.J. 384, 395-96 (1978-1979).
2. New York's generic substitution laws are typical of those found in most states. Stat-
utes require that a physician's prescription form contain two signature lines: one labeled
"dispense as written" and the other bearing the words "substitution permissible." N.Y.
EDUc. LAW § 6810(6) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). A prescription signed "dispense as
written" must be followed without deviation. If a prescription is instead signed "substitution
permissible," substitution is mandatory if a generic equivalent appears on an approved state
list. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6816-a(l) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§ 206(i)(o) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). If a generic drug does not appear on such a list,
then the decision to substitute is left to the discretion of the pharmacist in the individual
case. Unless the physician requests otherwise, a prescription filled with a generic drug must
bear a label containing the generic drug name and the name of the generic drug manufac-
turer. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6816-a(l)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). New York's generic
drug substitution law was recently found to be constitutional in Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n
v. Whalen, 54 N.Y.2d 486, 446 N.Y.S.2d 217 (1981).
3. See Pharmaceutical Soc'y of New York, Inc. v. Lefkowitz, 454 F. Supp. 1175, 1177-
78 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd, 586 F.2d 953 (2d Cir. 1978); Note, supra note 1, at 387.
4. Hyman, Old Drug/New Drug.- The Marketplace Influences the Law, 35 FOOD DRUG
COSM. L.J. 221, 222-23 (1980).
5. Over 12% of the more than eight billion dollar prescription drug market is generic.
This percentage is expected to increase as more states pass generic drug substitution laws.
See Rogers & Kahan, Recent Developments Regarding Look-Alike Drugs, 35 FOOD DRUG
CosM. L.J. 4 (1980).
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illegal drug substitution at the expense of the consumer.' Many generic
drug manufacturers seek to capitalize on the public's familiarity with the
shape and color combinations of name brand drugs7 by adopting identical
shape and color schemes for their own products once the particular
branded drug's patent has expired.8 These "look-alike" drugs make it rel-
atively easy for a druggist to illegally substitute a generic drug for a name
brand product and charge the customer the branded drug's typically
higher price with little fear that the consumer will detect the fraud.9
Traditionally, courts have resisted the efforts of commercial drug com-
panies to monopolize specific color schemes for particular drug products.
A color, by itself, is not protectable under the principles of trademark
law. I° Protection is possible only if a color is but one of numerous ele-
ments comprising, as a whole, a distinctive shape or design that is protect-
able." In addition, the color element must be nonfunctional' 2 and it must
6. See Willig, The Prosubstitution Trend in Modern Pharmacy Law, 6 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. I, 2-5 (1972).
7. Patent laws provide protection against the copying of an invention for a period of
seventeen years, and the patent cannot be renewed. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (Supp. IV 1980). A
trademark registration is valid for a twenty-year period but the registration may be repeat-
edly renewed. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1058-1059 (1976). For a discussion of the interrelationships
between patents and trademarks, see generally J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION, § 6 (1973).
8. Many of the major drug patents expired in the late 1960's, allowing the generic drug
companies to enter the market in direct competition with the original patent holders. See
Hooke, Generic Drug Laws and Unfair Competition Claims Under the Lanham Act-An Un-
easy Alliance: Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 227, 246 n. 158
(1980).
9. See Cooper, Trademark Aspects of Pharmaceutical Product Design, 70 TRADE-
MARK REP. 1, 31 n.lIl (1980).
10. See Campbell Soup Co. v. Armour & Co., 175 F.2d 795 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 847 (1949). In Campbell Soup, the court noted that there are only seven primary colors
and that competition would be stifled by a depletion of this limited supply: "If they may
thus monopolize red in all its shades the next manufacturer may monopolize orange in all its
shades and the next yellow in the same way. Obviously, the list of colors will soon run out."
Id at 798. See also Leschen Rope Co. v. Broderick, 201 U.S. 166, 170-71 (1906) (trademark
for a distinctively-colored streak woven into a wire rope held invalid for overbreadth when
it would be infringed by a rope containing a streak of any color, however applied).
I1. See Quabaug Rubber Co. v. Fabiano Shoe Co., 567 F.2d 154 (1st Cir. 1977); In re
Data Packaging Corp., 453 F.2d 1300 (C.C.P.A. 1972); American Waltham Watch Co. v.
United States Watch Co., 173 Mass. 85, 53 N.E. 141 (1899).
12. A feature of a trademark is functional only if it provides a product with greater
utility or contributes to its economy of manufacture, serving some purpose other than identi-
fication of the product. J. MCCARTHY, supra note 7, at § 7:26(A). Trademarks with func-




have acquired a secondary meaning' 3 in the marketplace." 4
If a pharmacist dispenses a generic drug with a label containing the reg-
istered mark of another, the name brand drug manufacturer may bring
suit for trademark infringement under the federal trademark laws.15 Sec-
tion 32(1) of the Federal Trademark (Lanham) Act of 194616 provides a
civil cause of action for the misuse of another's registered trademark in
connection with the sale or advertisement of goods where such use is likely
to cause confusion or deception. In addition, a body of judicially-created
law has arisen under section 32 to predicate liability upon manufacturers
and distributors who, by aiding or encouraging others to infringe a trade-
mark, contribute to the confusion and deception of the consumer.' 7
Although the marketing of imitative drug products may not per se in-
fringe a registered trademark, the colors of such drugs may nonetheless
facilitate illegal substitution by pharmacists. Recently, in Inwood Labora-
tories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc. ,18 the Supreme Court addressed the
circumstances in which a manufacturer of "look-alike" generic drugs may
be held liable for contributory infringement under the Lanham Act. On
purely procedural grounds, the Court reversed a Second Circuit ruling that
generic drug companies that manufactured drug capsules identical to a
13. Secondary meaning arises as a result of a mental association in the consuming pub-
lic's mind between the trademark of a good and the source or origin of that product. Id at
§ 15:2.
14. See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d
Cir. 1979) (colors and design of cheerleader uniform held nonfunctional and use of a strik-
ingly similar costume in a sexually explicit film found to cause consumers to erroneously
associate Texas professional football team with the film's producers and characters).
15. Federal Trademark Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1976 & Supp. III 1980)).
16. Section 32(1) of the Lanham Act provides in part:
Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant-(a) use in commerce
any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in
connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods
or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or
to cause mistake, or to deceive; or (b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably
imitate a registered mark and apply such reproduction. . . to labels. . . intended
to be used in commerce upon or in connection with the sale. . . of goods or serv-
ices on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive; shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the
remedies hereinafter provided.
15 U.S.C. § 1114(l) (1976).
17. See, e.g. Coming Glass Works v. Jeannette Glass Co., 308 F. Supp. 1321
(S.D.N.Y.), aft'dper curiam, 432 F.2d 784 (2d Cir. 1970); Stix Products, Inc. v. United
Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See also J. MCCARTHY, supra
note 7, at §25:2(A). Many of these cases rely upon the pre-Lanham Act contributory in-
fringement decisions. Cf. John B. Stetson Co. v. Stephen L. Stetson Co., 85 F.2d 586 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 605 (1936); Reid Murdoch & Co. v. H.P. Coffee Co., 48 F.2d 817
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 621 (1931).
18. 102 S. Ct. 2182 (1982).
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name brand product were liable for contributory infringement under sec-
tion 32 of the Act.
Ives Laboratories was the manufacturer of cyclandelate, a prescription
drug sold under the registered trademark "Cyclospasmol." 9 The arbitrary
color-dosage scheme developed by Ives for "Cyclospasmol" was copied by
many of the generic drug companies after Ives' patent had expired.2" Re-
sponding to instances of mislabeling and illegal substitution by pharma-
cists, 21 Ives brought suit under section 32 of the Lanham Act to enjoin the
manufacturers and wholesalers of the generic version of "Cyclospasmol"22
from marketing their drug products in identically colored capsules. Ives
contended that the imitative capsule colors and suggestive comparison cat-
alogs23 induced pharmacists to infringe the "Cyclospasmol" mark. Addi-
tional claims for relief were based on section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
24
19. "Cyclospasmol" is a peripheral and cerebral vasodilator used to increase blood flow
in patients with vascular diseases. Id at 2184.
20. Ives markets "Cyclospasmol" in pale blue 200 milligram capsules imprinted with
"Ives 4124" and in blue and red 400 milligram capsules imprinted with "Ives 4148." Id at
2184. Only after litigation began did some of the defendants imprint identifying marks on
their capsules. Id at 2184 n.3.
21. Ives Labs., Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 455 F. Supp. 939, 944 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). One of
the original defendants in the case was Lowitt Labs., Inc., a retail pharmacist. Lowitt con-
sented to a court decree enjoining it from further acts of substitution and mislabeling. Id at
942.
22. Manufacturers Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., Inwood Laboratories,
Inc., and MD Pharmaceutical Co., Inc. each purchased cyclandelate powder and empty cap-
sules and assembled the final generic product. Wholesalers Darby Drug Co., Inc., Rugby
Laboratories, Inc., and Sherry Pharmaceutical Co., Inc. purchased the cyclandelate capsules
and resold them to retail pharmacies. Id at 941-42.
23. These catalogs, aimed at the retail pharmacist, described the color of the cyclande-
late capsules, emphasized their equivalence to "Cyclospasmol," and included a price com-
parison chart highlighting the lower cost of the generic cyclandelate capsules. 102 S. Ct. at
2185.
24. Ives claimed that the generic drug manufacturers' imitation of the capsule colors of
"Cyclospasmol," nonfunctional features of the drug, constituted a false designation of the
drug's true origin. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any goods
or services, or any container or containers for goods, a false designation of origin,
or any false description or representation, including words or other symbols tend-
ing falsely to describe or represent the same, and shall cause such goods or services
to enter into commerce, and any person who shall with knowledge of the falsity of
such designation of origin or description or representation cause or procure the
same to be transported or used in commerce or deliver the same to any carrier to be
transported or used, shall be liable to a civil action by any person doing business in
the locality falsely indicated as that of origin or the region in which said locality is
situated, or by any person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the
use of any such false description or representation.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976).
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Contributory Infringement Standard
and the New York unfair competition laws.25
The district court denied Ives' request for a preliminary injunction. It
held that Ives had not shown that the generic drug manufacturers know-
ingly and deliberately conspired with pharmacists or suggested that they
disregard prescription orders for "Cyclospasmol."26 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that the lower court
had applied an overly narrow standard for contributory infringement. It
held that "a manufacturer or wholesaler would be liable under section 32
if he suggested, even if only by implication, that a retailer fill a bottle with
the generic capsules" and apply another's mark to the label or if it contin-
ued to supply the generic drug capsules to a pharmacist who the manufac-
turer "knew or had reason to know was engaging" in such practices.
27
Nonetheless, the court of appeals held that Ives' evidentiary showing was
insufficient to grant a preliminary injunction.28
On remand, the district court dismissed the suit. It concluded that the
evidence of mislabeling presented at trial did not demonstrate that the ge-
neric drug companies "suggested by implication" that pharmacists could
infringe upon Ives' mark.29 The court also rejected Ives' other claims,
finding that the capsule colors were functional3" and that secondary mean-
ing had not been established.3 In a two-to-one decision, the Second Cir-
cuit reversed and held that the evidence demonstrated that the generic
drug manufacturers could anticipate that a substantial number of druggists
25. Ives, 455 F. Supp. at 942, 951. Ives alleged that the generic drug companies' dupli-
cation of capsule colors placed an "instrumentality of fraud into the hands of retail pharma-
cists" under state common law principles and a New York business statute. N.Y. GEN. Bus.
LAW § 386-d (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982).
26. Ives, 455 F. Supp. at 945.
27. lves Labs., Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 601 F.2d 631, 636 (2d Cir. 1979).
28. Id.
29. Ives Labs., Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 488 F. Supp. 394, 397 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). The
court also suggested that the instances of mislabeling were due to pharmacists who misun-
derstood the requirements of the New York generic drug substitution laws. Id at 397-98.
30. The district court accepted the generic drug manufacturers' evidence that: (1) color
has a therapeutic effect and elderly patients accustomed to the colors of "Cyclospasmol"
would refuse to take or would be upset by a generic drug of a different capsule color; (2)
patients often mix multiple prescription drugs in a single container and remember which
drug to take by its color; and (3) color serves to identify the drug in an emergency overdose
situation. Id at 398-99.
31. Id. at 401. The district court found that patients do not associate the name "Cyclo-
spasmol" with a particular manufacturer but only with its healing effect or with a particular
ailment. The court gave little credence to an undocumented study of thirty-six "Cyclospas-
mol" patients. Only one-third of the patients correctly identified the pale blue or blue and
red capsules as "Cyclospasmol" without prompting, another one-third were able to make the
association after being provided with a list of ten drug names, and the remaining third were
unaware that the drug they had been taking was called "Cyclospasmol." Id at 399-400.
1982]
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would use "look-alike" capsules to either illegally substitute the generic
product or mislabel it as "Cyclospasmol. ' '3z The appellate court remanded
the case and ordered the district court to enjoin the sale of cyclandelate in
"look-alike" capsules.
33
The Supreme Court reversed on procedural grounds. Writing for the
majority, Justice O'Connor stated that the court of appeals was bound by
the "clearly erroneous" standard of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.34 Therefore, the Second Circuit could not overturn the district
court's finding merely because it would have given different weight to or
drawn different conclusions from the evidence. 35 Because the court of ap-
peals never reached Ives' remaining claims, 36 the Court remanded the case
for further proceedings. In a concurring opinion, Justice White, joined by
Justice Marshall, maintained that the court of appeals had impermissibly
weakened the standard for a section 32 violation 37 and criticized the ma-
32. Ives Labs., Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 638 F.2d 538, 545 (2d Cir. 1981). Cyclandelate
is not on the New York list of approved generic drug substitutes. See supra note 2 and
accompanying text. If a prescription is to be filled with "Cyclospasmol" but is actually filled
with generic cyclandelate, an illegal substitution has occurred. If substitution is permissible
and a generic form is indeed dispensed but labeled as "Cyclospasmol," an "intermediate"
case of trademark infringement has occurred. Id at 543.
Ives conducted two studies to demonstrate the frequency of illegal substitution. Forty-one
pharmacies were randomly selected from the Hayes Directory of New York drug stores,
while an additional forty-two were personally selected by Ives. In each case, a pharmacist
was provided with a prescription for "Cyclospasmol" signed "substitution permissible." In
the control (Hayes) survey, 17 pharmacists dispensed generic cyclandelate and 4 labeled it as
'Cyclospasmol." In the Ives survey, 18 dispensed cyclandelate and 6 mislibeled it as
"Cyclospasmol." In one case, the higher brand name price was passed on to the consumer.
Id at 542.
Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc. also conducted its own survey of 50 pharmacies,
half with prescriptions for "Cyclospasmol" to be dispensed as written, the other for "cyc-
landelate" to be dispensed as written. Nonetheless, two of the cyclandelate prescriptions
were labeled "Cyclospasmol." Id at 543 n.7.
33. Id at 545. Dissenting, Judge Mulligan took issue with the majority's finding that
the generic drug companies had failed to offer any "persuasive" evidence for using the same
capsule color scheme without characterizing the lower court's finding of functionality as
"clearly erroneous." Id at 547. He also disputed the reliability and significance of the mis-
labeling surveys. Id at 546. As the majority correctly noted in a footnote to its discussion of
the surveys, Mulligan's finding that the percentage of cases involving mislabeling was 12%,
as opposed to the majority's figure of 29%, was based fallaciously on the total sample size.
Such a base figure was overinclusive because there was no opportunity for mislabeling when
a prescription for "Cyclospasmol" was filled with "Cyclospasmol." 
d at 543 n.7. g
34. Inwood, 102 S. Ct. at 2188; see FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
35. 102 S. Ct. at 2189.
36. Having found a violation of § 32, the Second Circuit did not address the § 43(a) or
state unfair competition claims. Ives, 638 F.2d at 540.
37. 102 S. Ct. at 2191.
[Vol. 32:345
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jority for silently acquiescing to such a change.3" In addition, Justice
White declared that a showing of functionality should provide a complete
affirmative defense to a contributory infringement claim.3 9 In a brief con-
currence, Justice Rehnquist disagreed with the majority's determination
that the district court's findings were not clearly erroneous, arguing that
the court of appeals was better equipped to decide such a question.'
Ives raises significant questions concerning the standards and defenses
involved in a section 32 violation. This Note will examine the develop-
ment of common law and statutory principles in the areas of contributory
infringement and trademark protection for colored drug products. It will
analyze and evaluate the Ives Court's conclusions in light of prior case
decisions and the evidence presented at trial. The Ives decision will be
criticized for both its failure to clarify the contributory infringement stan-
dard and its failure to address the overriding issue of capsule color protec-
tion. Finally, the potential impact of Ives' upon consumers and brand
name manufacturers will be discussed.
I. COMMON LAW CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION STANDARDS
The earliest and most frequently cited Supreme Court opinion on con-
tributory trademark infringement prior to the passage of the Lanham Act
is William A Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co.."' Lilly manufactured a
chocolate-flavored quinine preparation under the trademark "Coco-Qui-
nine." It sought to enjoin Warner from manufacturing a similar product
under the mark "Quin-Coco."4 2 The Court found that Warner was at-
tempting to profit from the commercial reputation of "Coco-Quinine" by
suggesting that it would be in a druggist's interest to fill orders for "Coco-
Quinine" with the lower-cost "Quin-Coco," and that substitution could be
made without danger of detection.43 The Court concluded that Warner's
salesmen induced the substitution "in direct terms or by suggestion or in-
sinuation," and that such wrongful actions enabled dealers to pass off
Warner's preparation as that of Lilly." The Court found that one "who
induces another to commit a fraud and furnishes the means of consum-
38. Id at 2192.
39. Id
40. Id at 2193.
41. 265 U.S. 526 (1924).
42. Id at 527-28.
43. Id at 529-30.
44. Id. at 530.
19821
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mating it is equally guilty and liable for the injury. '45 Although the Court
granted an injunction against further fraudulent activity,46 it refused to
enjoin the use of chocolate because the evidence demonstrated that it was
a functional ingredient. 7 Instead, the Court required Warner's packages
to bear labels clearly distinguishing the two products with a warning that
"Quin-Coco" was not to be used in filling prescription orders for "Coco-
Quinine.
4
In Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co. ,4 the Supreme Court addressed
the relevance of functionality and secondary meaning in a situation where
a manufacturer attempts to protect its product after the patent has expired.
National Biscuit held the patent rights to the process for making the cereal
product known as "Shredded Wheat." When the patent expired, Kellogg
began to market its own version of the cereal. National Biscuit brought
suit under a state unfair competition statute, alleging that Kellogg's use of
the name "Shredded Wheat" and the cereal's corresponding "pillow
shape" enabled Kellogg and others to pass off the product as one produced
by National Biscuit.5° The Court refused to protect National Biscuit's use
of the words "Shredded Wheat," noting that the term was generic5' and
that it accurately described the product as it was generally known by the
public.52 Because the term became generic before the expiration of the pat-
ent, both the right to make the product and the right to apply the name
associated with it passed into the public domain. 53
45. Id at 530-31 (citing Hostetter Co. v. Brueggeman-Reinert Distilling Co., 46 F. 188,
189 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1891)).
46. 265 U.S. at 532.
47. Id at 532. While chocolate served no therapeutic purpose, it imparted a distinctive
color and "masking" flavor to the preparation and served as a suspension medium for the
quinine. Id
48. Id at 532-33. Commentators have criticized this type of remedy as ineffective, be-
cause it calls attention to the product's lower cost and ignores the existence of other distinc-
tive flavors. See, e.g., Swenson, Property Rights in the Color and Shape of Capsules, 32 FOOD
DRUG CosM. L.J. 361, 363 (1977); Cooper, supra note 9, at 10.
49. 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
50. Id at 116.
51. The word "generic" as applied in trademark law is a term of art. It denotes the
name of the product and not the name of its source. Since a generic term does not indicate
source or origin, it may never be protected by a trademark. If a producer of a new good fails
to impress upon the public that the mark identifies the manufacturer or retailer rather than
the type of good, a court may declare a mark to be generic and the mark will pass into the
public domain. J. MCCARTHY, supra note 7, at § 12:1-9. See, e.g., King-Seeley Thermos Co.
v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963) ("thermos"); Du Pont Cellophane Co. v.
Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1936) ("cellophane"); Charles R. De Bevoise Co. v.
H. & W. Co., 69 N.J. Eq. 114, 60 A. 407 (1905) ("brassiere").
52. 305 U.S. at 116.
53. Id at 118. Accord Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896).
[Vol. 32:345
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The Court also found that National Biscuit failed to demonstrate that
the name "Shredded Wheat" had acquired a secondary meaning. The
Court concluded that the term's primary significance in the consumer's
mind was the cereal itself and not its source.54 Similarly, the cereal's
unique "pillow shape" could not be protected because the patented ma-
chines that produced the shredded wheat were designed to produce it only
in this shape. In addition, the public had become accustomed to associat-
ing the pillow shape with the product,55 and the Court found this pillow
shape design to be functional.56 Unlike Warner, there was no evidence
that Kellogg intended to deceive consumers.57 Kellogg's different packag-
ing and distinctive labels58 demonstrated that it had taken reasonable pre-
cautions to prevent confusion or deception in the sale of its product.59 In
dismissing the case, the Court declared that a company's desire to share in
the goodwill of a product not protected by a patent or a trademark is a
right which can be freely exercised by the public at large.6°
The last major pronouncement on the contributory infringement stan-
dard prior to the enactment of the Lanham Act was made in Coca-Cola
Co. v. Snow Crest Beverages, Inc. 6 Coca-Cola brought an action for
trademark infringement and unfair competition under federal and Massa-
chusetts law, alleging that retail dealers were passing off Snow Crest's "Po-
lar Cola" for a similar soft drink produced by Coca-Cola.62 Coca-Cola's
primary claim concerned the aural similarity between the two cola
names.63 The court found that the sounds were not strikingly similar or
confusing when understood in the context of color, spelling, script, and
general background.' 4 The standard for contributory infringement, the
court said, was whether the wrongful actions of another "might well have
54. 305 U.S. at 118.
55. Id at 119-20.
56. The evidence suggested that the use of any other shape in the manufacture of shred-
ded wheat would result in an increased cost or an overall lower quality product. Id at 122.
57. Id
58. Id at 120-21.
59. Id at 122.
60. Id
61. 64 F. Supp. 980 (D. Mass. 1946), aft'd, 162 F.2d 280 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S.
809 (1947).
62. 64 F. Supp. at 982, 987.
63. Id at 987. Like marks with imitative design features, protection may be denied to
names likely to be confused with other trademarked goods when spoken aloud. J. MCCAR-
THY, supra note 7, at § 23:5. See, e.g., Communications Satellite Corp. v. Comcet, Inc., 429
F.2d 1245 (4th Cir. 1970) (Comsat and Comet); La Touraine Coffee Co. v. Lorraine Coffee
Co., 157 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1946) (La Touraine and Lorraine); Esso, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co.,
98 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1938) (Esso and S.O.).
64. 64 F. Supp. at 990-91.
19821
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been anticipated ' 65 by the manufacturer. Although it recognized that one
is not per se responsible for the actions of another, the court said accounta-
bility should turn on whether a reasonable person in a similar position
would realize that he had created an opportunity or a temptation for an-
other to commit a wrong or that he was dealing with one known or be-
lieved to be engaging in unethical business practices.66 The court
dismissed the suit, finding no evidence that Snow Crest had suggested in
its sales talks, advertising, or packaging that retailers should substitute
"Polar Cola" on specific orders for "Coca-Cola."
67
Although a doctrine of contributory trademark infringement was formu-
lated before the passage of the Lanham Act, the federal trademark statutes
existing at the time were generally considered to be inadequate to protect
fully the trademark registrant. 68 The legislative history of the Lanham Act
indicates that the statute was intended to create uniform trademark rights
throughout the United States69 by codifying, clarifying, and modernizing
common law trademark concepts70 that had been diluted by state courts
and legislatures. 7' The Act also liberalized trademark registration proce-
dures and the remedies for trademark infringement.72
The Lanham Act contains two significant sections providing relief for
trademark infringement. Section 32 creates a civil cause of action for the
registrant of a valid federal trademark if an infringer uses a confusingly
similar trademark in commerce. 73 The plaintiff must show that the use of
the similar trademark is likely to cause consumer confusion. In evaluating
65. Id at 989.
66. Id
67. Id at 987. The evidence also indicated that other brands were frequently substi-
tuted for "Coca-Cola." Only 24 specific orders for "Coca-Cola" were actually filled out of
201 such orders in 35 taverns. The remaining orders were filled by at least five other cola
brands. Id at 986-87.
68. The 1905 Trademark Act made it difficult for United States citizens to register
trademarks in foreign countries, federal registration was only prima facie evidence of owner-
ship which could be rebutted, and the statutory language was too narrow to encompass the
realities of twentieth century commerce. J. MCCARTHY, supra note 7, at § 5:3-4.
69. S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV.
1274.
70. Id
71. Trade-Marks: Hearings on HA 102, HR. 5461, and S. 895 Before the Subcomm. on
Trademarks of the House Comm. on Patents, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, 131-33 (1941); Trade-
Marks Hearings on S, 895 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Patents, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1942). See also S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Johnson, 175 F.2d 176
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949); M. & D. Simon Co. v. R. H. Macy & Co., 152 F.
Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
72. J. MCCARTHY, supra note 7, at § 5:4.
73. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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the mark, courts look to the strength 74 of the mark, the similarity between
the marks, the type of goods protected, and any evidence of actual con-
sumer confusion.75 No one factor is dispositive and the protection af-
forded any given mark will depend upon the facts and circumstances in
the particular case.
Section 43(a) of the Act provides a trademark owner who does not pos-
sess a federally registered mark a cause of action for unfair competition
under federal common law.76 To prevail, a plaintiff must establish that
goods or services are involved, that interstate commerce is affected, and
that the infringer has falsely designated the source or origin of the prod-
uct.77 Section 43(a) broadened the earlier prohibition against a false
designation of geographic origin to include any false description or repre-
sentation.7' The test for a section 43(a) violation is similar to that for a
section 32 claim: whether the infringer's mark is likely to cause confusion
as to the source of the good or service. 79 In addition, section 43(a) pro-
vides a civil action for false advertising.8 0
II. THE DRUG COLOR CASES: FUNCTIONAL OR FRAUDULENT USE OF
COLOR?
In the early common law decisions, courts often looked to the corre-
sponding packaging of the goods in determining questions of trademark
infringement. Even today, courts may conclude that bottles of over-the-
counter liquid medicines, cardboard boxes of cereal, and cartons of soda
sufficiently distinguish essentially identical products so as to prevent con-
sumer confusion or deception. Prescription drug products, however, inher-
ently lack such distinctive packaging. Customers never see the
manufacturers' cartons in which the drugs are shipped. They must rely
solely upon the pharmacist-typed label and the features of the individual
tablet or capsule to identify the source of the drug. Thus, drug companies
74. Whether a mark is "strong" or "weak" is a reflection of its likelihood to confuse
consumers of that good. Arbitrary, fanciful, and suggestive marks are entitled to trademark
protection. Marks which are descriptive are protectable only if they have acquired a secon-
dary meaning. Thus, a strong mark would be highly fanciful and arbitrary, while a weak
mark would be primarily descriptive. See J. MCCARTHY, supra note 7, at § 23:15(F).
75. See, e.g., V.I.P. Foods, Inc. v. Vulcan Pet, Inc., 210 U.S.P.Q. 662, 666 (N.D. Okla.
1980).
76. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
77. V.I.P. Foods, Inc. v. Vulcan Pet, Inc., 210 U.S.P.Q. at 668.
78. Trade-Marks." Hearings on HA 13486 Before the House Comm. on Patents, 69th
Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1927).
79. See, e.g., V.I.P. Foods, Inc. v. Vulcan Pet, Inc., 210 U.S.P.Q. at 668.
80. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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have attempted to establish consumer identification with the shapes and
colors of their particular drug products and have fought vigorously to en-
force their rights against "copycat" competitors. 8
Smith, Kline & French Laboratories v. Clark & Clark82 is one of the ear-
liest cases involving generic drug substitution. Smith, Kline & French
(SKF) sought an injunction against the manufacture and sale of Clark &
Clark's patent-infringing amphetamine tablets under New Jersey unfair
competition laws.83 The court found that the infringing tablets closely re-
sembled those produced by SKF in shape, color, and scoring and that the
two tablets were distinguishable only upon close examination.84 The
court, however, refused to grant an injunction beyond the life of SKF's
patent, recognizing that SKF would not have an exclusive right to manu-
facture the tablets after the patent expired8" and finding that the various
features of the amphetamine tablets were functional.86 Instead, the court
upheld the district court's findings of unfair trade practices. The evidence
showed that Clark & Clark's salesman suggested that its tablets could be
used to fill prescriptions for SKF's tablets with little risk of detection and
that he emphasized the enhanced profit to be made by such conduct.87 The
court enjoined any further palming offt 8 and required Clark & Clark's tab-
lets to be stamped with a distinguishing mark such as 6C&C.9989
81. See Hooke, supra note 8, at 244-45.
82. 157 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1946).
83. Id. at 726.
84. Id at 730. Although some of the generic drug manufacturers in Ives started to
imprint their capsules after litigation ensued, see supra note 20 and accompanying text, the
appellate court recognized such action to be of "dubious value." Ives, 601 F.2d at 643. In a
recent case, the Third Circuit noted that many elderly patients (and judges) over the age of
50 have difficulty reading the logos on their capsules. SK&F, Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical
Labs., Inc., 625 F.2d 1055, 1061 (3d Cir. 1980).
85. 157 F.2d at 731.
86. The scoring of the white tablets allowed the tablets to be broken into smaller dos-
ages, the beveled and concave edges prevented crumbling and aided breakage, and the natu-
ral color of the tablets was white. Id at 730.
87. Id at 731.
88. The term "palming off" as used by courts can refer to three distinct situations: (1)
substitution of one brand of goods on an order for another brand; (2) trademark infringe-
ment where the infringer intended to defraud and confuse the consumer; or (3) trademark
infringement where there is no proof of fraudulent intent but there is a likelihood of confu-
sion among consumers as to the source of the good. J. MCCARTHY, supra note 7, at
§ 25:1(A). McCarthy believes that the term should be limited to its original common law
usage as denoting intentional substitution or fraud. Id at § 25:1(C).
89. Smith, Kline & French Labs. v. Clark & Clark, 157 F.2d 725, 731 (3d Cir. 1946). In
response to this suit, SK&F adopted a new shape and color scheme for the same ampheta-
mine capsules. It gave considerable publicity to the tablets' distinctive orange and tan
"heart" shape. A rival company began to send postcards to druggists containing a pictorial
representation of identical tablets with the words "Color Guaranteed," which it later speci-
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The evidentiary proof necessary to prevail in an intentional palming off
action was considerably reduced by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in Upjohn Co. v. Schwartz. 90 Schwartz manufactured
and sold seven drug preparations that were virtually identical in size,
shape, and color to Upjohn's products.9 ' Upjohn brought an action for
both trademark infringement and unfair competition. The district court
considered many of the shapes, sizes, and colors of Upjohn's products to
be nonfunctional,92 but it dismissed the trademark infringement count be-
cause Upjohn failed to demonstrate proof of secondary meaning.93 Be-
cause Upjohn was unable to produce any evidence that pharmacists were
actually substituting Schwartz's products for those of Upjohn,94 the court
also dismissed the unfair competition claim. Holding the lower court's re-
quirement of actual substitution to be in error, the court of appeals re-
versed. It noted that the marketing strategy of the company consisted of
the use of printed cards that listed Schwartz's products. Each drug listing
was accompanied by a corresponding blank line, upon which Schwartz's
salesmen would write in the name of Upjohn's equivalent product.95 The
court considered these cards "suggestive." Although there was no evi-
dence of any actual palming off, the court concluded that the use of the
comparison cards, when considered with Schwartz's marketing of the pre-
scription at one-half the price of Upjohn's products demonstrated
Schwartz's intent to compete unfairly and to deceive the public.96
fled as being "orange" and "tan." SKF brought an action for unfair competition. The trial
court found the shape and colors of the tablets to be nonfunctional. Nineteen cases of illegal
substitution were documented, and although the record did not show any instance of direct
substitution or inducement, the court held that the lower price and the postcard advertising
methods created the possibility of substitution in the minds of the druggists. The court en-
joined the defendant from marketing its product in the same shape or colors or any others
that would closely resemble those of SKF or be likely to enable a pharmacist to palm off the
defendant's product as SKF's. Smith, Kline & French Labs. v. Heart Pharmaceutical Corp.,
90 F. Supp. 976, 977-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
90. 246 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1957).
91. Id. at 256.
92. Upjohn Co. v. Schwartz, 131 F. Supp. 649, 651 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), rev'd in part, 246
F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1957).
93. Id at 653.
94. Id. at 655.
95. Upjohn Co. v. Schwartz, 246 F.2d 254, 257. (2d Cir. 1957).
96. Id at 257-58. See also Smith Kline & French Labs. v. Broder, 125 U.S.P.Q. 299
(S.D. Tex. 1959), in which the defendant's advertising in circulars emphasized the similari-
ties in appearance and dosage between SKF's trademarked capsules and tablets and those it
produced. In some instances, samples of the imitative heart-shaped tablets were mailed
without any identification or description as to composition or source other than the attached
below-market price. The court found that such advertisements were suggestive and that
pharmacists were thereby induced to substitute imitative products. 125 U.S.P.Q. at 301-02.
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Schwartz was enjoined from "either directly or indirectly, representing or
suggesting" that its products be substituted for those of Upjohn. In addi-
tion, the court ordered that Schwartz's containers bear a notice stating that
the contents were not to be sold or dispensed as Upjohn's product.
97
Although the liberal ruling in Upjohn should have increased the brand
name manufacturers' ability to protect colored drug products, another Sec-
ond Circuit case decided just two years later, Norwich Pharmacal Co. v.
Sterling Drug, Inc.,98 made it more difficult to establish that a drug's color
is to be considered nonfunctional and that it can acquire a secondary
meaning. Norwich marketed a pink over-the-counter stomach remedy
known as "Pepto-Bismol" and claimed that the marketing of Sterling's
product constituted unfair competition.99 Like other courts, the Second
Circuit refused to consider whether color could be monopolized in associa-
tion with a specific product. " The court found that the color of the stom-
ach remedy was functional, not because it possessed any inherent
therapeutic value, but because it was intended to create a "pleasing ap-
pearance" to the sufferer.' ' The court also'found no conclusive evidence
to suggest that the color had acquired a secondary meaning. Norwich's
public opinion survey, introduced at trial, indicated only the popularity of
"Pepto-Bismol," not the existence of secondary meaning. The court con-
cluded that the presence of over thirty other pink upset stomach remedies
would prevent the public from associating the pink color exclusively with
"Pepto-Bismol."' 2 In the absence of any evidence of palming off, actual
deception, or appropriation of property rights,'0 3 the court held that an
injunction was not justified.
Twelve years passed before a court again addressed the issues involved
in a drug color case."° Marion Laboratories, Inc. v. Michigan Pharmacal
97. 246 F.2d at 262.
98. 271 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1959).
99. Id at 570.
100. Id at 572 (citing Campbell Soup Co. v. Armour & Co., 175 F.2d 795 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 847 (1949); Doeskin Prods., Inc. v. Levinson, 132 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y.
1955); and Radio Corp. of America v. Decca Records, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 493 (S.D.N.Y.
1943).
101. 271 F.2d at 572. "Psychosomatic functionality" has been widely criticized. See, e.g.,
Cooper, supra note 9, at 13-14.
102. 271 F.2d at 572.
103. Id at 571.
104. In addition to the decision in Norwich, at least two additional factors may account
for the dearth of trademark prosecution during this time. First, the lack of legally substitut-
able generic drugs undoubtedly precluded the need to contest the marketing of "look-alike"
capsules in most cases. The repeal of the antisubstitution drug laws in the late sixties and
early seventies changed this. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
Second, and perhaps more important, the Supreme Court held, in a pair of decisions, that
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Corp. -05 involved two claims of unfair competition under Michigan
law.' °6 Marion packaged its trademark drug "Pavabid" in brown and
clear capsules. Michigan Pharmacal marketed the generic form in an
identically colored capsule.'0 7 The court agreed that the color of Marion's
capsules should be given protection as an element of the product's trade
dress.' 08 It found the features to be nonfunctional and concluded that pur-
chasers could be induced to buy the product because of the color's as-
sumed indication of origin. " Nonetheless, Marion was denied relief due
to its inability to demonstrate that the features had acquired secondary
meaning prior to Michigan Pharmacal's entrance into the marketplace." 0
The court also concluded that Marion had failed to document any in-
state laws of unfair competition could not prevent the copying of an unpatented product.
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Light-
ing, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964). For an in-depth analysis of the significance of these decisions,
see Dannay, The Sears-Compco Doctrine Today.- Trademarks and Unfair Competition, 67
TRADE-MARK REP. 132 (1977). See also Cooper, supra note 9, at 15-22; Hooke, supra note
8, at 240-44, 248-54. For over a decade, the practical effect of the Sears-Compco doctrine
was to cast doubt upon the applicability of the Lanham Act when functional features were
copied. The Ives court held that the Sears-Compco doctrine did not bar federal unfair com-
petition claims under § 43(a). Ives, 601 F.2d at 642. Other circuits have reached a similar
conclusion. See, e.g., SK&F, Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Labs., Inc., 625 F.2d 1055 (3d
Cir. 1980); Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1976).
105. 338 F. Supp. 762 (E.D. Mich. 1972), a§'dmem., 473 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1973).
106. The court found that the law of Michigan was consistent with the general law of
unfair competition and noted that both state and federal courts freely borrow decisions from
each other, as well as from the entire body of law on unfair competition. 338 F. Supp. at
767.
107. Id at 763.
108. A similar argument was advanced in E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Premo Pharma-
ceutical Labs, Inc., 195 U.S.P.Q. 545 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Squibb contended that Premo's use
of a gold foil wrapper on its generic nystatin was confusingly similar to Squibb's in-
travaginal tablets marketed as "Mycostatin." Although the court had jurisdiction of
Squibb's § 43(a) Lanham Act claim, it granted a permanent injunction under New York
unfair competition law because a likelihood of consumer confusion had been established.
Id at 550-51.
109. 338 F. Supp. at 766-68. The capsule color was found to be nonfunctional because
the gelatin could take on any shade or degree of transparency irrespective of the color of the
drug itself. Marion also introduced at trial a color wheel provided by Eli Lilly & Co. which
illustrated that as many as 12,000 color combinations are available. Id at 768. Counsel for
Ives attempted to make a similar argument. On the motion for preliminary injunction, the
district court refused to consider capsules and their corresponding colors as "trade dress,"
holding that because the capsules were ingested by the patient, they were themselves
"goods." Ies, 455 F. Supp. at 948. The court of appeals took a more liberal view, re-
marking that it saw "no basis in principle for saying that simply because the colored capsule
is ingested, the color cannot constitute 'trade dress.'" Ives, 601 F.2d at 644.
110. Although Marion was able to show that secondary meaning was established by
1970, Michigan had been doing business as early as 1967. 338 F. Supp. at 769.
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stances of actual palming off.I" Like other jurisdictions, Michigan did not
require proof of actual deception to establish a claim of unfair competition
if deception would be the natural and probable consequence of a defend-
ant's actions.' 2 Although Michigan Pharmacal's catalogs listed Marion's
"Pavabid" as comparable to its own product, the catalogs specifically
stated that the comparison was made for the pharmacist's "reference and
reminder." Unlike other drug company advertisements, the catalogs made
no reference to the product's color or price." 3 In addition, there was no
evidence that Michigan Pharmacal's salesmen suggested or encouraged
any substitution.' " 4 As a result, the court dismissed the suit, finding that
Marion had failed to meet its burden of proof on either of its claims.
Unlike the result in Marion Laboratories, the burden of proof for a
claim of intentional palming off was met in Merrell-National Laboratories,
Inc. v. Zenith Laboratories, Inc. "' Merrell manufactured DEP, a pre-
scription appetite suppressant sold under two trademarks. Zenith's prod-
uct simulated the color, shape, and appearance of Merrell's tablets, and
Zenith's literature described the two drugs as comparable."I6 Merrell
brought suit for unfair competition and false representation, accusing
Zenith of placing an instrumentality of fraud into the hands of retail phar-
macists." I7 Merrell was able to document at least nine instances where
pharmacists had passed off Zenith's product as DEP, as well as one in-
stance in which the wrong product was shipped on a specific order for
Merrell's tablets.1 8
The court found this evidence to illustrate passing off in its "most bla-
tant form."'  In determining whether or not the manufacturers could be
held contributorily liable for the actions of the pharmacists, the court
stated that "if the passing off is foreseeable or reasonably may be antici-
pated, liability rests with the manufacturer even in the absence of any in-
tent to pass off by the manufacturer."' 2° Therefore, the court granted a
preliminary injunction prohibiting the manufacture of DEP products in a
form similar to Merrell's tablets and enjoined any attempt to pass Zenith's
I1. Id
112. Id at 767 (citing Weisman v. Kuschewski, 243 Mich. 223, 219 N.W. 937 (1928)).
113. 338 F. Supp. at 770.
114. Id
115. 194 U.S.P.Q. 157 (D.N.J. 1977), afdon rehearing, 579 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1978).
116. 194 U.S.P.Q. at 158.
117. Id
118. Id
119. Id at 159.




goods off as those of Merrell. 12'
III. THE IVES ANALYSIS
Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc. 122 is the first drug
color case to have been considered by the Supreme Court.'23 Unlike ear-
lier generic drug cases, the issue on appeal was based upon section 32 of
the Lanham Act, rather than on section 43(a).' 2 4 Justice O'Connor began
the Ives opinion by framing the overriding issue, namely, the circum-
stances in which a generic drug manufacturer, who designedly duplicates
the appearance of a competitor's equivalent product, can be held vicari-
ously liable for the actions of pharmacists who improperly dispense the
generic drug. 25  After Justice O'Connor reviewed the proceedings below,
she briefly analyzed the contributory infringement standard. She acknowl-
edged, as did the lower courts, that under certain circumstances a manu-
facturer can be held responsible for trademark infringement at the
distribution level, even if the manufacturer does not directly control others
involved in the distribution process:
[I]f a manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another to
infringe a trademark, or if it continues to supply its product to
one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trade-
121. 194 U.S.P.Q. at 160-61.
122. 102 S. Ct. 2182 (1982).
123. Since the time Ives first filed suit in federal court, at least five other cases involving
generic drugs have been reported. In each of these suits, the plaintiffs pressed claims under
state unfair competition laws and § 43(a) of the Lanham Act. In each case, the plaintiff was
granted injunctive relief after successfully demonstrating consumer confusion as to source,
secondary meaning, nonfunctional features, or predatory practices. See SK&F, Co. v.
Premo Pharmaceutical Labs., Inc., 625 F.2d 1055 (3d Cir. 1980); Boehringer Ingelheim
G.m.b.H. v. Pharmadyne Labs., Inc., 211 U.S.P.Q. 1163 (D.N.J. 1981); Hoffman La Roche,
Inc. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Labs., Inc., 210 U.S.P.Q. 374 (D.N.J. 1980); A.H. Robins Co.
v. Medicine Chest Corp., 206 U.S.P.Q. 1015 (E.D. Mo. 1980); Pennwalt Corl. v. Zenith
Labs., Inc., 472 F. Supp. 413 (E.D. Mich. 1979), appeal dismissed, 615 F.2d 1362 (6th Cir.
1980). While the Ives courts were, of course, bound by the precedent that existed when the
suit commenced, the Supreme Court, had it reached the merits of Ives, would have been free
to take judicial notice of these recent developments. The SK&F decision is especially note-
worthy since the identical color functionality claims present in Ives were argued and rejected
as invalid. SK&F, Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Labs., 625 F.2d at 1061-62.
124. While Ives' major claim was a § 43(a) violation, the § 32 violation was the only
substantive issue fully discussed on appeal to both the Second Circuit and to the Supreme
Court. 102 S. Ct. at 2193. This is not unexpected given the difficulty in documenting illegal
substitution and the lack of prior law under § 32 in a drug color context. The court of
appeals remarked that it was "surprising" that Ives was able to produce as many cases of
illegal pharmacist activity as it did. Ives, 638 F.2d at 543. Much of the case law discussed
throughout the procedural history of Ives relies on § 43(a), pre-Lanham Act common law
principles, and New York state unfair competition laws.
125. 102 S. Ct. at 2184.
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mark infringement, the manufacturer or distributor is contributo-
rially [sic] responsible for any harm done as a result of the
deceit. 
126
In a footnote, the Court acknowledged that language in the court of ap-
peals opinion suggesting that the generic manufacturers "could reasonably
anticipate" illegal substitution would in itself be an incorrect standard but
the Court interpreted that statement as mere support for the court of ap-
peals conclusion that the criteria had been met. 127
Having explicated the correct contributory infringement standard to be
applied, the Court devoted the remainder of the opinion to procedural er-
rors committed by the court of appeals. Justice O'Connor found that the
court of appeals improperly overturned the district court holding that the
generic drug companies did not intentionally induce substitution or supply
pharmacists likely to mislabel, without first ruling that such conclusions
were "clearly erroneous." 128 Recognizing that a trial judge has a unique
opportunity to weigh evidence and to evaluate the credibility of wit-
nesses,29 the Court held that an appellate court must accept a trial court's
findings unless it possesses a "definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been committed."' 3 According to Justice O'Connor, the court of ap-
peals erred when it rejected the district court's findings simply because it
would have given more weight to the evidence of mislabeling than the trial
court did. 131
The Court also held that the court of appeals erred in substituting its
own interpretation of the evidence for that of the trial court when it con-
cluded that the generic drug companies could have reasonably anticipated
misconduct. In addition, the court of appeals also erred when it ignored
findings suggesting that any confusion was due to a misunderstanding as to
the requirements of New York law, when it maintained that illegal substi-
tution was not the de minimus in New York, and when it declared that
there were no legitimate reasons for marketing an imitative product.
32
The Court mentioned, without elaboration, that a finding of functionality,
126. 1d. at 2188 (citing William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526 (1924)
and Coca-Cola Co. v. Snow Crest Beverages, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 980 (D. Mass. 1946), af'd,
162 F.2d 280 (ist Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 809 (1947)).
127. 102 S. Ct. at 2188 n.13.
128. Id at 2188 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) and Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 102 S. Ct.
1781 (1982)).
129. 102 S. Ct. at 2188-89 (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395
U.S. 100 (1969)).
130. 102 S. Ct. at 2189 (citing United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364,
395 (1948)).
131. 102 S. Ct. at 2189.
132. Id at 2189-90.
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normally an issue in cases alleging a section 43(a) Lanham Act violation,
may have some relevance in a section 32 action. 133 Since the court of ap-
peals never reached the section 43(a) or state unfair competition claims,
the majority remanded the case for further review.
In a concurring opinion, Justice White, joined by Justice Marshall, chal-
lenged the majority for deciding the case on procedural grounds. Justice
White noted that the issue of whether the court of appeals had misapplied
the clearly erroneous standard was not included in the generic drug manu-
facturers' petitions for certiorari.'34 The majority suggested no reason for
ignoring their own procedural rules for certiorari, 35 and Justice White
himself expressed doubt as to whether he would have granted certiorari on
the purely fact-bound questions which the majority addressed. Nonethe-
less, he concurred with the result because of his belief that the court of
appeals "watered down to an impermissible extent" the standard for a sec-
tion 32 contributory infringement violation.1
36
Justice White contended that the court of appeals abandoned the test it
set out on the earlier preliminary injunction motion. He felt that the court
of appeals, in reviewing the case on the merits, was satisfied merely by the
ability of the generic drug companies to "reasonably anticipate" that ille-
gal substitution was likely, rather than a showing of intentional illegal sub-
stitution.'37 He noted that both courts and commentators have suggested
that the mere possibility that a dealer might pass off goods or that some
illegal substitution could occur is insufficient to predicate liability upon the
manufacturers of generic drugs.' 38 He then accused the majority of im-
plicitly endorsing the standard employed by the court of appeals and
thereby silently acquiescing to a significant change in the traditional test
for contributory infringement. 139 He agreed that the court of appeals erred
when it set aside the district court's finding that the capsule colors were
functional without first declaring that such a finding was clearly erroneous.
Although the court of appeals found no persuasive evidence to justify the
use of imitative colors, such a conclusion was inapposite to the finding that
133. Id at 2190 n.20. No authority was supplied to support this proposition.
134. Id. at 2190-91. This was conceded at oral argument by the petitioners. See Ex-
cerpts from Oral Argument, The Ires Case, 72 TRADE-MARK REP. 78, 103 (1982).
135. 102 S. Ct. at 2191. See Sup. CT. R. 21.1(a).
136. 102 S. Ct. at 2191.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 2191-92 (citing William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526
(1924); Coca-Cola Co. v. Snow Crest Beverages, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 980 (D. Mass. 1946), a'd,
162 F.2d 280 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 809 (1947); and J. MCCARTHY, supra note 7, at
§ 25:2).
139. 102 S. Ct. at 2191.
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they eased patient anxiety or aided in identification. 141 Justice White went
further than the majority in explicating the proper role of functionality in a
section 32 claim. According to Justice White, a finding of functionality
should act as a complete affirmative defense to a section 32 contributory
infringement action based solely upon the reproduction of a product's
functional features. 141
IV. THE CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT STANDARD IN IvES: FORM
OVER FUNCTIONALITY?
Ives provides Supreme Court authority for maintaining a suit for con-
tributory trademark infringement under section 32 of the Lanham Act. It
also sets out the appropriate test for imposing vicarious liability on manu-
facturers who induce trademark infringement. It is clear that the second
prong of the test predicates liability on a generic drug manufacturer who
supplies pharmacists known or believed to be engaged in illegal trademark
infringement.142 The majority and Justice White are also in agreement as
to the wording of the first prong, that a manufacturer may be liable for
intentionally inducing another to infringe a trademark.143 They disagree,
however, over exactly what will constitute intentional inducement.
Disagreement over the interpretation of the first prong centers on the
court of appeals' use of the words "reasonably anticipate" in making out a
finding of suggestive behavior on the part of the generic drug manufactur-
ers. While neither the majority opinion nor the concurrence expressly
states that a showing of "suggestion by implication" is sufficient to consti-
tute intentional inducement of another to infringe a trademark, both ap-
prove of the standard set out earlier in the review of the preliminary
injunction motion and the Warner decision which embodies such lan-
guage." Yet, Justice White believes that the court of appeals abandoned
this standard in favor of a showing that the generic drug manufacturers
"reasonably anticipated" substitution and mislabeling.145 As the majority
correctly notes,146 the court of appeals prefaced its decision with a state-
ment that it was applying the legal principles set forth in its earlier
140. Id White also notes that color and shape can be "psychologically reassuring." Id
at 2192 n.3 (citing 3 R. CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS, AND
MONOPOLIES, § 82.1(m) (3d ed. Supp. 1981)).
141. 102 S. Ct. at 2191. No authority or precedent was cited in support of this theory.
142. Id at 2188, 2191.
143. Id
144. Id at 2188, 2191-92.
145. Id at 2191.





A careful reading of the opinion of the court of appeals reveals that it
did not assess liability merely because some unspecified amount of illegal
substitution might possibly have occurred. Rather, the court held that the
generic manufacturers could reasonably anticipate that a substantial
number of druggists would illegally substitute or mislabel "look alike" cyc-
landelate capsules. 14 It was the manufacturers' use of capsules identical in
size, shape, and color to "Cyclospasmol," together with catalogs compar-
ing the appearances and prices of the two drugs, that amounted to "sugges-
tion by implication."' 49 The court of appeals did not merely conclude that
a manufacturer might reasonably anticipate substitution, but that the ge-
neric manufacturers of cyclandelate adopted the same color capsules in
actual anticipation that they would "successfully capitalize upon public ac-
ceptance of 'Cyclospasmol.' "I " While the Supreme Court interpreted this
language as merely representing support for the basic finding of intent, it
did not express an opinion as to the amount of weight, if any, that such a
finding should be given in determining if "suggestion by implication" has
been demonstrated. In any event, the court of appeals did not develop this
"watered down" standard on its own. Language in the Coca-Cola decision
and the drug color cases since Marion Laboratories support this view.''
Assuming that the court of appeals did err in failing to employ the
"clearly erroneous" standard, the Supreme Court opinion is still disap-
pointing. While the Supreme Court set out a contributory infringement
"standard," it provided neither the type of behavior nor the amount of
evidence sufficient to constitute "suggestion by implication." To avoid re-
viewing the record and applying the standard to the facts of the case, the
Court conveniently hid behind the truism that a trial court is in the best
position to evaluate evidence and the character of witnesses. Yet, numer-
ous decisions have held that an appellate court is as competent as a lower
court to evaluate documentary evidence. 152 Most of the proof on the con-
147. Ives, 638 F.2d at 542.
148. Id. at 543, 545.
149. Id. at 543.
150. Id. at 545. Ives' brief for the Supreme Court cited a New York Attorney General's
report that found that nearly 25% of pharmacies in New York violate the drug substitution
laws. See PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 562, at A-4 (Jan. 14, 1982).
151. Merrell-National Labs., Inc. v. Zenith Labs., Inc., 194 U.S.P.Q. 157, 160 (D.N.J.
1977) (liability imposed "if the passing off is foreseeable or reasonably may be anticipated");
Marion Labs., Inc. v. Michigan Pharmacal Corp., 338 F. Supp. 762, 767 (E.D. Mich. 1972)
(actual proof is not necessary if "the deception will be the natural and probable consequence
of defendant's acts"); Coca-Cola Co. v. Snow Crest Beverages, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 980, 989 (D.
Mass. 1946) (test is that the wrongdoing "might well have been anticipated").
152. Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 271 F.2d 569, 571 n.5 (2d Cir. 1959);
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tributory infringement issue in Ives was squarely before the court of ap-
peals: the "look-alike" capsules, the allegedly "suggestive" catalogs, and
the evidence of mislabeling and illegal substitution. The court of appeals
relied primarily on these factors to infer intent and assess liability.' 53 Even
if one concedes that the results of the surveys were inconclusive, liability
has been predicated on less evidence of suggestive or actual intent in past
decisions.' 5 4 One must agree with Justice White that the majority was un-
justified in deciding the case on an issue that was not raised in the petitions
for certiorari. Merely to provide a standard without measuring the facts of
the case against it creates an opinion of dubious utility.
Because the court of appeals failed to apply the "clearly erroneous"
standard, it is now bound by the lower court's ruling that the colors of the
capsules are functional. Yet, the court of appeals found that there were
other successful generic manufacturers of cyclandelate who did not adopt
the same color scheme as Ives.'" It is difficult to conclude that color can
be a functional attribute of a drug capsule or tablet in the absence of a
universal color identification standard.' 56 Unless all cyclandelate capsules
are blue and red, a given consumer may not be accustomed to identifying
cyclandelate by such colors. The generic prescription that the consumer
has been taking could be orange and black or any other color combination.
The practical ability of a capsule's color to allow identification of the type
of drug and to relieve patient anxiety is inherently weakened by the pres-
ence of competitive, nonimitative generics.
Indeed, the very role of functionality in a section 32 claim is overempha-
Upjohn Co. v. Schwartz, 246 F.2d 254, 261 n.8 (2d Cir. 1957); Coca-Cola Co. v. Snow Crest
Beverages, Inc., 162 F.2d 280, 283 (lst Cir. 1947).
153. Ies, 638 F.2d at 543.
154. See generally Upjohn Co. v. Schwartz, 246 F.2d 254, (2d Cir. 1957) (no actual cases
documented, only suggestive cards and imitative colors and shapes); Merrell-National Labs.,
Inc. v. Zenith Labs., Inc., 194 U.S.P.Q. 157 (D.N.J. 1977) (nine instances of palming off, one
case of mislabeling, suggestive catalogs, and imitative colors and shapes); Smith, Kline &
French Labs. v. Heart Pharmaceutical Corp., 90 F. Supp. 976 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (19 illegal
substitutions, no direct inducement to infringe, suggestive postcard advertising, and imita-
tive colors and shapes).
155. Ires, 638 F.2d at 545.
156. The court in SK&F, Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Labs., Inc., 625 F.2d at 1064,
ruled that the color of an imitative diuretic drug in an identical half maroon and half white
capsule was nonfunctional when another manufacturer sold the drug in an orange tablet
form and the color was not itself an industry standard. See McLaren, Lanham Act Protection
From the Copying f/Trade Dress By Generic Drug Manufacturers, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1223, 1228 n,25 (1981). For support of the argument that color "shades" should be register-
able, as is the practice in France and the Benelux countries, see generally, Cooper, supra




sized by both the majority opinion and Justice White's concurrence. Since
Warner was decided, courts and commentators have indicated that where
actions involving intentional passing off have been established, relief
should be granted despite a finding of functionality.'57 While this position
has generally been advanced in only state unfair competition cases, Justice
White noted that a purpose of the Lanham Act was to codify the common
law of state unfair competition, and he found no indication that Congress
had intended to depart from Warner and its contemporaries. 58 Adoption
of Justice White's far-reaching and unsupported claim that functionality
should act as a complete affirmative defense to a section 32 claim would
provide tacit approval to infringement in such a situation and would ig-
nore the very purpose of the Act. Functionality should not act as a shield
to protect those who intentionally pass off their goods for those of another.
Although the majority posits that a finding of functionality may be
somewhat relevant in a section 32 claim, it fails to elaborate upon this
point. A critical analysis of the drug color cases reveals that a finding of
functionality has traditionally affected only the remedy provided by a
court once intentional passing off or infringement has been demonstrated.
Thus, the cases fall into three discernible categories: (1) producers of
nonfunctionally shaped or colored drugs who are enjoined from any fur-
ther imitative copying; 59 (2) producers of drugs with functional features
who are required to employ precautionary labeling or packaging;' 60 and
(3) producers of drugs possessing a psychosomatic effectI61 who are en-
157. See generally William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526 (1924);
Upjohn Co. v. Schwartz, 246 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1957); Smith, Kline & French Labs. v. Clark
& Clark, 157 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1946). The remaining cases either failed to prove predatory
practices or involved shapes and colors that were found to be nonfunctional. See also Rog-
ers & Kahan, supra note 5, at 6.
158. 102 S. Ct. at 2191 n.2 (citing S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
1946 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 1274). Furthermore, contributory infringement under § 32(I)
parallels the common law action for supplying an instrumentality of fraud which is capable
of deceiving the public. Hooke, supra note 8, at 235.
159. See generaly Merrell-National Labs., Inc. v. Zenith Labs., Inc., 194 U.S.P.Q. 157
(D.N.J. 1977); Smith Kline & French Labs., Inc. v. Broder, 125 U.S.P.Q. 299 (S.D. Tex.
1959); Smith Kline & French Labs. v. Heart Pharmaceutical Corp., 90 F. Supp. 976
(S.D.N.Y. 1950).
160. See generally William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526 (1924);
Upjohn Co. v. Schwartz, 246 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1955); Smith, Kline & French Labs. v. Clark
& Clark, 157 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1946).
161. The court of appeals found that there would be no additional cost incurred with the
use of a different color capsule and that this would most effectively alert the consumer. Ives,
638 F.2d at 545. See also Cooper, supra note 9, at 12-15, 44-45. Many of the post-Ives cases
acknowledged the often irrational psychological effects that color can induce but have none-
theless held that the capsule or tablet color was not functional. See supra note 123 and
accompanying text.
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joined only after a court balances the hardships to the parties and the pub-
lic policy issues involved. 1
62
The court of appeals in Ives emphasized that physicians and pharma-
cists have the option of informing their patients that the different colored
generics are identical in utility to the brand name variety, thus allowing
the patient to decide whether to pay the typically higher price for a famil-
iar capsule color. 163 In the event that a patient might have an adverse
reaction to a different color capsule due to a placebo effect, the doctor may
then specifically order that the prescription be dispensed with only the
trademarked drug.
Whether or not one agrees with the Ives decision, one must still question
why, in a case raising significant and competing issues of public policy in
the prescription drug industry, the Court refused to address such issues.
162. Arguing in both the court of appeals and in the Supreme Court, the Justice Depart-
ment, in an amicus curiae brief, sided with the generic drug manufacturers in favor of "fair
and open competition in the prescription drug industry." See PAT. TRADEMARK & COPY-
RIGHT J. (BNA) No. 557, at A-7 (Dec. 3, 1981). The Government argued that a § 32 analysis
"requires a balancing of the procompetitive effect of trademarks in identifying products for
consumers and the anticompetitive effect of raising barriers to market entry by forbidding
imitation." Id
Perhaps the best response to this admittedly valid concern is found in SK&F, Co. v.
Premo Pharmaceutical Labs., Inc., 625 F.2d 1055 (3d Cir. 1980):
[C]ertain kinds of business activity, while promoting competition in the short run,
are in the long run apt to be destructive of competition. . . . Permitting a business
climate in which substitutions of products over which the first manufacturer has no
quality control in the long run can only discourage the effort to compete on the
basis of reputation for quality. But even if the Lanham Act and the New Jersey
law of unfair competition were not in the long range interests of competition,
preventing deception of the public is itself in the public interest. . . . Neither of-
fends the federal antitrust laws, for those laws have never been held to require
toleration of acts or practices presently or potentially deceptive.
Id at 1067.
Since the Supreme Court decided iyes, two district courts have concluded that the public
interest would be best served by enjoining the sale of generic "look-alike" drugs. A prelimi-
nary injunction was imposed in each case once the district court found section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act to have been violated. In Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., Inc.,
547 F. Supp. 1095 (D.N.J. 1982), the court declared that "the public will be harmed by the
existence of defendant's product because it permits, if not encourages, illegal substitution."
Id at 1117. In American Home Prods. v. Chelsea Labs., (D.N.J. 1982), the court empha-
sized that the public interest in preventing consumer deception was especially strong when
prescription drugs are involved. See 24 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA), 415
(Aug. 26, 1982).
163. Ives, 638 F.2d at 544-45. A similar conclusion was reached in Ciba-Geigy Corp. v.
Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., Inc., 547 F. Supp. 1095 (D.N.J. 1982), where the court concluded
that the defendant's conduct endangered the public interest by "jeopardizing the consumer's
admitted right to sufficient information so that he can give informed consent to such substi-




As Justice White suggested, the procedural issue dominating the majority
opinion was not the likely basis for originally granting certiorari. One can
only surmise that the Court, upon closer examination, realized that Ives
should not be the test case for granting color capsule protection under the
Lanham Act. In the past, all attempts to protect drug colors have been
advanced under section 43(a) of the Act, which encompasses a broader
claim for relief than those allowed under section 32.164 Thus, the anomaly
of a claim for relief against the imitation of capsule colors under section 32
would be a major reason for any court to avoid deciding questions that are
sufficiently controversial in their own right. In doing so, the Court leaves
open the possibility that it may again face the color capsule problem and
resolve it under more favorable circumstances.
65
V. CONCLUSION
Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc. provides Supreme
Court acknowledgement that liability may be imposed on a manufacturer
who intentionally induces illegal substitution or who continues to supply
goods to one it knows or has reason to know is committing trademark
infringement under section 32 of the Lanham Act. Generic drug compa-
nies are not the only ones who will be affected by the Court's ruling. This
decision may potentially have an impact upon all manufacturers of com-
mercial goods and represents yet another judicial attempt to hold industry
accountable for its direct or indirect actions.
Because the majority never applied the standard it promulgated to the
facts of the case, the metes and bounds of the type of action that constitutes
"suggestion by implication" in a generic drug context, remain shrouded in
speculation.' 66 Until color capsule imitation and comparision catalogs are
finally declared to be either legitimate or impermissibly suggestive, it is
164. See supra note 8.
165. Although the Court may not have realized it, the procedural ruling in Ives fore-
closed further action by the court of appeals in its attempt to review the case. While § 43(a)
admittedly encompasses a broad claim for relief, functionality is still a defense to the action.
102 S. Ct. at 2193 n.4 (citing International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg Co., 633
F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981)). On remand, the Second Circuit,
bound by the district court's holding that cyclandelate capsule colors are functional, was
unable to declare that a finding of functionality under § 43(a) was "clearly erroneous" if it
was not found to be clearly erroneous under § 32(1). Accordingly, it affirmed the district
court's ruling and dismissed both the § 43(a) and the state unfair competition claims. See
Epilog, The Ives Case, 72 TRADE-MARK REP. 117 (1982).
166. At least one post-Ives court has interpreted the Supreme Court's purported rejection
of the "reasonable anticipation" standard to be limited to § 32 claims, concluding that the
Ives opinion had no affect on a "reasonable anticipation" standard under § 43(a). See Ciba-
Geigy Corp. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., Inc., 547 F. Supp. 1095, 1115-16.
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unlikely that the generic drug companies will change their current market-
ing strategies. 167 With the expiration of the patents on Valium over the
next three years,' 68 it is foreseeable that imitation by generic drug manu-
facturers will only continue, increasing the likelihood of illegal substitution
by unscrupulous pharmacists. Ultimately, it is the consumer's pocket, pro-
tected from the evils of a "color monopoly," that will be most injured by
the Supreme Court's decision in Inwood Laboratories, Inc. P. Ives Labora-
tories, Inc.
Darrel C Karl
167. The generic drug manufacturers may not have to change their marketing strategies.
On July 22, 1982, Rep. Barney Frank (D-Mass.) introduced legislation that would amend
§ 43(a) of the Lanham Act to exempt generic "look-alike" drugs under certain circum-
stances. The bill, H.R. 6840, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), would not consider the use of
bioequivalent FDA-approved drugs to constitute a false designation of origin or a false
description or representation. In addition, the imprint of the manufacturer or distributor
would be required when technologically feasible. See 24 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT
J. (BNA), 412 (Aug. 26, 1982).
168. Barbash, The Court Blocks Move to Curb Generic Drugs, Wash. Post, June 2, 1982 at
D-l, col. 2.
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